Adorno : cultural education and resistance by Jessop, Sharon
Strathprints Institutional Repository
Jessop, Sharon (2016) Adorno : cultural education and resistance. 
Studies in Philosophy and Education. pp. 1-15. ISSN 0039-3746 , 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11217-016-9531-6
This version is available at http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/58449/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any  correspondence  concerning  this  service  should  be  sent  to  Strathprints  administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
Adorno: Cultural Education and Resistance
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Abstract In recent years, culture has become significantly politicized, or conspicuously
de-politicized, in different parts of the UK, making its appearance in education policy of
pivotal interest and ripe for critical attention. From the vantage point of Theodor Adorno’s
work on the culture industry and his writings on the work of the teacher, I argue that
cultural education is a site where something crucial and distinctive takes place. Within the
Enlightenment tradition, critical self-reflection and resistance to heteronymous ways of
thinking are core aims of education. Adorno’s contribution to an understanding of these
aims leads us to consider the importance of ‘live contact with the warmth of things’ as
essential to ethical and intellectual life. The kindly tolerance of the pluralist ideal is now
being teased and goaded by acts of terror and widespread concern about personal and
social security. At such an unstable juncture, an understanding of cultural education as an
experience of ‘incorrigible plurality’ enriches and informs the beleaguered ideal of plu-
ralism and points a way forward in troubled times.
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The room was suddenly rich and the great bay-window was
Spawning snow and pink roses against it
Soundlessly collateral and incompatible
World is suddener than we fancy it
World is crazier and more of it than we think,
Incorrigibly plural. I peel and portion
The tangerine and spit the pips and feel
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The drunkenness of things being various.
The fire flames with a bubbling sound for world
Is more spiteful and gay than one supposes –
On the tongue on the eyes on the ears in the palms of one’s hands –
There is more than glass between the snow and the huge roses.
Louis MacNeice ‘Snow’ 1935
Introduction
This article offers a hermeneutical approach to education policy in relation to arts and
culture, informed by the work of Theodore Adorno on the culture industry and in his
aesthetic theory. I begin with a detailed account of recent policy trends in cultural edu-
cation, using a comparison between two divergent contexts to illustrate where choices have
been made that reflect differing political and social priorities. The aim is to provide an
interpretation and understanding of the significance of these choices for the educational
project and to point to the particular opportunities presented by cultural education.
UK Policy on the Arts and Education
None of the four countries of the UK is a state in its own right, but the separation of
nationhood and statehood has had a different effect on the cultural self-understanding of
each country because of the different ways in which each entered, or was brought, into the
Union, their relative size and their relationships to the centres of power. The political
import of culture policy has become increasingly evident in recent years as the under-
pinning principles of different devolved UK administrations diverge.
With no political locus until the establishment of the devolved parliament in 1999,
Scotland has been anxious about identity and culture for a long time. Onewidely held opinion
is that the cultural production of the people who live in Scotland has been systematically
suppressed and ignored by successive UK institutions, leading to a marked lack of self-belief
(Beveridge and Turnbull 1989; Craig 2003; Moffat and Riach 2014). This might be stony
ground for a new curriculum that seeks to couple culture and history with a view to fostering
exploration, reflection and the solving of problems (Education Scotland 2013, p. 2). However,
culture features prominently in plans for the country’s future. Successive Scottish adminis-
trations have seen cultural activity as a key concern as expressed in a quite phenomenal
number of government strategies, reports and commissioned studies over the past few years.
Public discussion has been vigorous and occasionally acrimonious, but a general approach is
emerging which strongly suggests an understanding of the value of cultural activity that is
highly distinctive in the UK context. Illustrative of this claim is the discourse surrounding the
policies of certain government departments and agencies in the last couple of years.
At the end of 2013, the chief executive of Creative Scotland resigned after months of
criticism from the arts community. The organization, which is the development agency
with responsibility for the distribution of public funds for the arts, was accused of being
infected with ‘a kind of undead Thatcherism, a half-baked, hollowed-out, public sector
version of market theory that reduces the language of creativity to a series of flat-footed
business school slogans, and imposes a crude ethic of sado-competition’ (McMillan 2012).
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An open letter from 100 prominent artists and writers followed in October 2012 criticizing,
amongst other things, the dominance of commercial values over those that are social and
cultural in Creative Scotland’s policies (Herald 2012). The idea of ‘creative enterprise’ was
vigorously challenged by an artistic community that rejected its re-designation as a unit of
economic production.
In June 2013, following this public embarrassment, the Scottish culture secretary gave a
speech in which she strongly asserted the distinctive nature of her government’s approach.
In this, she says that ‘culture and heritage have value in and of themselves…because they
are our heart, our soul, our essence’. The economic value of culture ‘is not its primary
purpose but a secondary benefit’ (Hyslop 2013). In quite startling contrast, the then English
Culture Secretary described funding for the arts as ‘venture capital’ in a speech given in
April 2013. The purpose of the speech, she said, was to ‘hammer home the value of culture
to our economy…. Our focus must be on culture’s economic impact’ (Miller 2013). In the
face of this hard-faced neoliberalism, even the Chair of the Arts Council in England
explicitly abandoned any attempt to communicate her belief that ‘culture is a deep
necessity to human beings’ because ‘politicians aren’t interested in that’ (Forgan 2013). In
both nations, the arts are struggling with an economic agenda that threatens their existence;
but, for the artistic community in Scotland there are stronger grounds for, very cautious,
optimism.
The economic utility of culture complements its political utility. The current adminis-
tration in Scotland is formed by the Scottish National Party in the most volatile UK political
scene since Margaret Thatcher’s era, a fact which might colour our understanding of the
motivations behind some government backing for the arts, since: ‘to conceive of Scotland as a
globally networked population of 40million people is arguably amore powerfulway to think.
It is clear that a strong cultural attachment to Scotland is a prerequisite for all other efforts to
engage diasporic groups’ (Ancien et al. 2009, p. 28). A question that needs to be asked is how
an outward-facing cultural event will affect the way in which those on the inside, as it were,
think about themselves in terms of their cultural identity or identities. In other words, what is
the effect of commodification on ‘intangible cultural heritage’? (McCleery et al. 2008, p. 10).
One obvious effect might be a bias to the ‘traditional’ meaning a selection of indigenous art
forms. This potentially distorts cultural activity in a plural society in a way that contradicts
government pronouncements and presents the danger of a nostalgic cultural necromancy
from which Scotland has only recently emerged.
Culture in Education Policy
The growing importance of cultural issues in the broader policy context is also reflected in
educational discourse. Striking changes have taken place over the past two decades in
terms of the frequency of use and also the context in which the term appears.
Education policy in Scotland is formed by means of a distinctive process of consulta-
tion, dispersal and consensus. The main programmatic statement for the school curriculum,
‘The Structure and Balance of the Curriculum’, in place between 1993 and 2010, lays out
the foundational principles and aspirations of the curriculum as a whole. Between the 1993
and 2000 editions of this document, the number of times the term ‘culture’ appears in some
form triples, partly due to the introduction of ‘The culture of Scotland’ as a cross-curricular
aspect. In 2006, a new curriculum was proposed and the principles were laid out in A
Curriculum for Excellence: Building the Curriculum 3–18 (1), in which the number of
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times ‘culture’ or ‘cultural’ appears almost triples again. Alongside this, there is, for the
first time, mention of cultural identity and a very strong emphasis on Scotland. A subse-
quent guidance document: ‘Building the Curriculum 3’ advises: ‘Children and young
people are entitled to a broad general education…. Throughout this broad curriculum it is
expected there will be an emphasis on Scottish contexts, Scottish cultures and Scotland’s
history and place in the world’ (2008, p. 5). ‘Learning about Scotland’ lays out in more
detail the ways in which the emphasis is to be achieved asserts the ‘entitlement for children
and young people to learn about Scotland’s cultures, people, history, achievements and
languages’ (Education Scotland 2013).
Whilst the Scottish curriculum has rapidly been gaining confidence in using the idea of
culture as a way of life and attempting to negotiate the difficulties involved in asserting
Scottish history and culture in a plural society, two major documents that have been
published south of the border indicate a strongly contrasting trend. The English National
Curriculum (2013) contains curiously little reference to culture, except in the context of
Design and Technology and in two instances where ‘other/different cultures’ are men-
tioned. There is a reference to ‘cultural development’ through the literature and a non-
specific reference to cultural history. There is not a single reference to English culture or
history, though there are numerous references to British history (DfE 2013, p. 165). The
general picture is that the concept of culture features very little and English culture, history
and identity are conspicuous only by their absence.
In 2012, a government commissioned review, ‘Cultural Education in England’ was
published. Its author, Darren Henley, interprets the term ‘culture’ in the sense of creative
endeavour: performance and expressive arts and design and the literature, thus apparently
avoiding the difficulties of talking about culture as also a way of life in a plural society.
However, the neutrality of culture as intellectual and artistic endeavour is deceptive. This
detailed 84-page report at no stage acknowledges the existence of anything other than a
unitary cultural heritage, though it does say in an oddly and somewhat anachronistically
worded statement that:
Children of all races and genders should be able to connect to the Cultural Education
that they receive. It is important that no minority groups are forgotten in any strategy
changes that take place as a result of this Review. (Henley 2012, p. 14)
Despite the lack of explicit ‘Englishness’ in this review of cultural education in England, it
seems that ‘minority groups’ are something of an afterthought. The thinking behind this
omission is a moot point. There are different ways of responding to the challenges of a
plural society and, considering the cultural and linguistic commonalities in the UK, it
might be surprising that the emphases in education policy are so markedly distinct.
The Scottish and English policy frameworks do not overlap in their application and are
not directly in conversation with one another, but the language nonetheless is a site of
struggle. The absence of markers of national identity from discussion in English education
results in a simulated sameness, which hides certain historical hierarchical relations
between the countries of the UK. Though the ideological projection of English identity as
British, and therefore normal, may in some ways protect power interests, it is not obvious
that this silence on English culture, history and identity will serve the individual or social
development of the English people. Contemporary discourse on culture takes place in full
view of politically and ethically contentious territory. It is imperative to distance policy on
cultural education from narrowly nationalistic, exclusive, discriminatory or parochial
associations, but complete silence on the topic dangerously and disingenuously creates a
void, which will be filled by voices peddling precisely this ideology. Current difficulties
S. Jessop
123
being experienced in parts of the English education system are the result of policies that
have permitted monocultural schooling, given isolationist minority parental groups free-
dom to exert strong influence on teaching and the curriculum, and, by inevitable corollary,
lessened local government supervision. A recent government commissioned investigation
into Birmingham schools found that an unrepresentative group of parents were able to take
key positions on school boards. Amongst their ‘achievements’ in certain schools were the
elimination of arts and humanities from the curriculum and the promotion of intolerance of
difference and diversity. This went unchallenged by the local council in order to protect
‘community cohesion’ (Clark 2014). Neoliberal governance without discussion of English
identities is creating social and political divisions, which will be increasingly difficult to
put right.
Despite their many similarities, Scotland and England are currently tracing very dif-
ferent paths in respect of their approaches to culture and to cultural education. Rejection by
the creative community in Scotland of their designation as mere commodity suggests a
self-conception that is strongly resonant with Adorno’s theory of culture: the hope of a not
completely reified culture which protects the possibility of social and political critique,
aligned with the dialectical vigour of pluralism.
Adorno and Culture
Scrutiny of Theodor Adorno’s concept of culture and his understanding of the role of the
teacher yields important insights into how cultural education is at the core of educational
practice. Adorno is one of the twentieth century’s foremost critics of modernity and is
well known for his application of Marxism to the conditions of late capitalism, and in
particular culture. He is not a writer whose work can be easily ‘applied’, nor did he wish it
to be. His work is anti-systematic, often incomplete, and fragmentary: he would not give
the reader the satisfaction of a completed argument because that is the very means by
which we are dominated, an idea that is central to his critique of culture itself. The unity of
form and content in Adorno’s writing is similar to that of Walter Benjamin with whom he
shared fundamental ethical, theological, political and philosophical commitments.1 An
utterly complete and consistent totality, or the aim to achieve one in argument, is what he
regarded as a Nazi aesthetic. His writing is intentionally fragmented and empirically
impressionistic. This is not the same as falling backwards into a mystical irrationalist world
view; certainty can be a sign that you have, in fact, stopped thinking. According to Adorno:
‘thought as such…is an act of negation, of resistance to that which is forced upon it’ (1966/
1981a, p. 19). More indirect communication, the use of montage, and the poetic all form
literary conditions in which insights may be caught, as it were, ‘out of the corner of [the]
eye or even at the corner of the text’ (Goehr 2005, p. xxxii). In the final aphorism of
1 In a letter to Benjamin, he says: ‘You are only too well aware how intimately the significance of the work
[Benjamin’s essay on Kafka] is bound up with its fragmentary character’ (Adorno and Benjamin 1999,
p. 67). Adorno would have been no supporter of ‘plain English’—or plain German—for that matter. In
Minima Moralia, he writes: ‘only the word coined by commerce, and really alienated, touches [people] as
familiar. Few things contribute so much to the demoralization of intellectuals. Those who would escape it
must recognize the advocates of communicability as traitors to what they communicate’ (p. 101). Elsewhere
in the same text, he says: ‘dialectic advances by way of extremes, driving thoughts with the utmost
consequentiality to the point where they turn back on themselves….’ (p. 86). It is unfortunate that this is not
widely acknowledged in cultural studies; it is easy to disagree with Adorno when isolated texts are taken as
‘representative example[s]’ of his thought (see, for example, Storey 2006, p. 66).
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Minima Moralia (1951/2005), he describes this off-kilter view: ‘Perspectives must be
fashioned that displace and estrange the world, reveal it to be, with its rifts and crevices, as
indigent and distorted as it will appear in the messianic light’ (p. 247). Adorno’s powerful
and intriguing critique illuminates a way of comprehending what is happening now in
cultural education, and perhaps venturing some thoughts on how we might proceed, but it
is not a formula or system which can be adopted, as it were ready to wear.
Adorno’s work on the ‘culture industry’ is relatively well known. Less well known are
his works of public philosophy, which mainly take the form of radio broadcasts. These
public lectures are often different in tone from his other writings and they focus strongly on
the immediate lived experience of people who are puzzling how to make sense of the
catastrophe that had befallen Germany and much of the rest of the world and also strug-
gling to make a society in which life is worth living. One group to whom he repeatedly
turns his attention is teachers and in this he draws on his experiences of interviewing and
examining candidates for entry to the profession. At this time, a major concern amongst the
Allies was the denazification of educators in Germany and Austria (Tent 1982). Adorno
returned to Germany as a US citizen and the Institute for Social Research was re-estab-
lished in Frankfurt with the support of the US government as part of a programme of
national re-education. But, Adorno addresses bigger issues about the selection and edu-
cation of teachers, their role in society and the purpose of education. Throughout, the
concept of culture is central.
Culture Industry
The idea of the ‘culture industry’ is an analysis of culture that could be misunderstood and
caricatured as somewhat hysterical elitism in which Hollywood is bad and Schoenberg is
good. In this respect, Adorno sometimes did not help himself, with his bilious dismissals of
jazz, the Beatles and ‘protest music’ of the 1960 s. A selective reading might indicate an
attack primarily on popular culture since it presents more obviously as an industry,
something that is produced and sold to a market, than does so-called high culture. But,
Adorno explicitly denied this interpretation of his analysis (1963/1975, p. 98). The culture
industry imposes ‘the profit motive naked onto cultural forms’ (1963/1975, p. 99). This
applies to both ‘light’ and ‘serious’ art in equal measure: ‘The differences in the reception
of official ‘classical’ music and light music no longer have any real significance. They are
still manipulated for reasons of marketability’ (1938/1982, p. 35). Cultural events that have
no cost have already been paid for by the working classes: ‘all culture shares the guilt of
society. It ekes out its existence only by virtue of injustice already perpetrated in the sphere
of production’ (1967/1981b, p. 26; see also 1944/1997, p. 159). For this reason, Adorno
dismisses as superficial cultural criticism that merely bemoans the commodification of
culture as though underneath the layer of capital there is a pure undamaged art form.
Though he understands art as autonomous and as having critical purchase on society,
including recalcitrant popular forms and the ‘advanced product [that] has renounced
consumption’ (1938/1982, p. 35), he argues that the commodification of art causes it to be
stripped of these qualities and to serve the goal of increasing capital both by the direct
exchange of money and also by causing people to accept the tenets and processes of
capitalism in exchange for transitory pleasure (1944/1997, p. 144).
At times, Adorno indicates that the possession of culture by the monopolistic, totalizing
action of capitalism is complete—all autonomy, conflict and resistance are ‘liquidated’ or
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‘eliminated’; ‘All difference degenerates to a nuance in the monotony of supply’ (1947/
1991, p. 74, 1963/1975, p. 99, 1967/1981b, p. 21). His most famous statement of despair
about culture, his Kulturpessimismus, was this:
Even the most extreme consciousness of doom threatens to degenerate into idle
chatter. Cultural criticism finds itself faced with the final stage of the dialectic of
culture and barbarism. To write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric.… Absolute
reification … is now preparing to absorb the mind entirely. (1967/1981b, p. 34)
Adorno’s despair about culture remained unassuaged to the end: ‘all post-Auschwitz
culture, including its urgent critique, is garbage’ (1966/1981a, p. 367). But, in other texts
Adorno’s exaggerated polemical style does give way to something more nuanced and he
concedes the possibility of a not completely reified culture, one that does at least appear to
challenge and resist.
Culture and the ‘Unity of Opposites’
The 2009 Christmas number one in the UK music chart was a fairly amusing surprise.
After an online campaign to ensure that the winner of the X-Factor did not achieve the
near-guaranteed number one slot, the rock band, Rage Against the Machine outsold other
contenders with a song that has the refrain: ‘FUCK YOU I WON’T DO AS YOU TELL
ME!’. The question is: should we believe its professed insubordination or should we
dismiss it as self-deception ‘in the service of success’? (1938/1982, p. 33). In this instance,
one of the musicians ably fielded the question in an interview for the Los Angeles Times:
‘When you live in a capitalistic society, the currency of the dissemination of information
goes through capitalistic channels…. We’re not interested in preaching to just the con-
verted (Hilburn, 1996). Without doubt, the campaign was intended to be a rejection of the
total commercialization the X-Factor represents.
Adorno admits that there was rarely, if ever, a ‘pure’ form of art, in which financial
considerations played no part: ‘Pure works of art, which deny the commodity society by
the very fact that they obey their own law were always wares all the same’ (1944/1997,
p.157). But, the fact that something is paid for does not entail that it is exclusively a
commodity— the commodification can be indirect and secondary. He cites the example of
Beethoven as ‘the most outstanding example of the unity of those opposites, market and
independence’ (1944/1997, p. 158). This idea of the ‘unity of opposites’ is key to
understanding Adorno’s position. The unity in question is not a ‘liquidation of conflict’ or a
stable and motionless balanced difference but rather a vital movement of ideas in response
and counter-response. Conflict within a work of art comes from its relation to practical
lived experience: ‘no authentic work of art…has ever exhausted itself in itself alone, in its
being-in-itself. They have always stood in relation to the actual life-process of society from
which they distinguished themselves’ (1967/1981b, p. 23). In contrast, the elimination of
conflict within the work of art indicates the sundering of this connection and the
fetishization of culture, which becomes like predigested baby food (1947/1991, p. 67).
Identitarian thinking is the collapse of the particular into the universal, resulting in a reified
culture which feeds us an unvarying world of fungible individuals; it replicates faithfully
the pre-existing standards, without startling or challenging or offering a stimulus to
imagine something different or better. Laminated familiarity, hyper-reality, paper-thin
variety, false immediacy—They are just like us! Only better! The presence of conflict leads
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to immanent criticality and this is what Adorno holds to be ‘true’ culture: ‘culture and
criticism are intertwined. Culture is only true when implicitly critical…. Criticism is an
indispensable element of culture which is itself contradictory’ (1967/1981b, p. 22).
Adorno’s rejection of the notion that culture is a good per se is based on this distinction
between reified (pseudo) culture and true culture, not on a hierarchy of high and low
culture.
The notion of true culture as it has so far been described may seem to advocate some
kind of social realism in art, but this is misleading. To understand its import better, we need
to turn to Adorno’s aesthetic theory and to the theme of mimesis. In Dialectic of
Enlightenment Adorno and Max Horkheimer put forward the thesis that the instrumental
reason so evident in late modernity is not a subspecies or distortion of formal reason, but
rather its sublation: its unfolding or unveiling. This is how we can understand the reach of
instrumental thinking as the dominance of objectifying thought, that relation to the world
that is functional, aetiological and inverts the primacy of ends to means, and that requires
the reductive categorization of mathematical–scientific thinking in order to predict, control
and dominate the natural world, including our social relations. We feel safe in the world
because we have conquered nature, or so we thought until we could no longer ignore the
evidence of the destruction wrecked by our untrammelled supremacy, our ‘open insanity’
(1944/1997, p. 54). But, this is merely the somatic pathology of enlightenment. Adorno and
Horkheimer point to the extension of this reifying tendency to subjectivity itself. This
means the renunciation of what they call ‘spirit’, those parts of human experience that are
not systematic, controllable or predictable, that are indeterminate, sensual, or that are part
of our experience because of their absence or silence. This is the living mind and is easier
to destroy than it is to describe in words: ‘The subjective spirit which cancels the animation
of nature can master a despiritualized nature only by imitating its rigidity and despiritu-
alizing itself in turn’ (1944/1997, p. 57). Reified consciousness, then, is the ultimate
achievement of the over-administered world.
Even if it were possible, and it is not, this account does not advocate some kind of return
to pre-enlightenment rationality, a re-enchanted, re-spiritualized world. And, it is not what
Hegel describes as a ‘pertulant zeal to save mankind from its absorption in the sensuous,
the vulgar and the singular’ (PG.8). What is it does do is set the scene for an enquiry as to
the location of spirit in late modernity. Quite obviously, the very fact that we can speak of
the totalizing tendency of reification, seen across all spheres of life, from our intimate
family relations to the marketization of education, means that the process is not complete.
The term Adorno chooses to describe the locus and activity of this site of resistance is
mimesis, a concept that is aptly resistant to efforts to comprehend it. It seems quite the
wrong term from the start because it is this logical principle of identity/non-contradiction
that itself lays down the identity thinking of exchangeability underpinning late modernity.
Why does Adorno choose a term that signifies ‘making like’ to disrupt this reductive
equivocation? In fact, he uses it in several quite distinct senses. Firstly, there is the mimesis
of the natural world that is part of magical, pre-rational human activity: the prehistory of
art. Then, there is also the mimesis that supplants this first kind with reason: ‘It is itself
mimesis: mimesis unto death. The subjective spirit which cancels the animation of nature
can master a despiritualized nature only by imitating its rigidity and despiritualizing itself
in turn’ (Adorno 1997, p. 57) This can be related to what I have so far called reified or
pseudo-culture.
The final usage is the mimetic moment that is in the dialectic between these first two
uses:
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The survival of mimesis, the non-conceptual affinity of the subjectively produced
with its unposited other, defines art as a form of knowledge and to that extent as
‘rational’. For that to which the mimetic comportment responds is the telos of
knowledge, which art simultaneously blocks with its own categories. Art completes
knowledge with what is excluded from knowledge and thereby once again impairs its
character as knowledge, its univocity. (1997, p. 74)
Even if we can accept the multivalency of this term, this last sense is surely still elusive. It
places art in a space between the magically animated pre-rational world and the totally
administered world, in a sense between life and death. Art bears witness to non-conceptual
knowledge; correspondingly mimesis is what Wellmer (2012) summarizes as the
‘designation for the sensually receptive, expressive, and communicative modes of
behaviour of the living’ (p. 51). Huyssen (2000) describes how the ‘dimensions of mimesis
lie outside linguistic communication—locked in silences, repressions, gestures and habits’
(p. 72). Again, Sinha (2000) noting that ‘the non-significative character of language is
given precedence over the significative or communicative aspect of language’ in Adorno’s
conceptualization of mimesis because the mimetic moment in art ‘expresses expression
itself and nothing else’. The elusive nature of this sense of mimesis is apt because it
concerns elusive knowledge, and here Adorno turns to the theological trope of redemption,
describing such a perspective as prefiguring the world as it will be revealed ‘one day in the
messianic light’ (2000 p. 153). The mimetic aspect of art resists the ‘destruction of the
subject’ under the conditions of modernity and redeems the living spirit: this is social
emancipation.
Adorno and Education: The End of Education and Teachers’ Work
For Adorno art and philosophy converge to occupy the same space: ‘two spheres of the
spirit’ (Wellmer 2012, p. 51). The recent fate of philosophy can be compared to that of
culture in that it has become separated from ‘concrete societal goals’ and has retreated
instead to content-less specialisms. Adorno cites Hegel’s proposition that ‘philosophy is its
own time comprehended in thought’. If contemporary culture embodies history, then
philosophy relates to that culture as resistance, as critique of the present state of the world
(1962/1998b, p. 14). So, when he proposes that criticism is intertwined with culture, he is
describing the relationship of philosophy to culture. In making this connection, it becomes
possible to think of culture in relation to what Adorno asserts to be the end of education
and the role of the teacher.
One of Adorno’s most well-known statements about education is from his essay ‘Ed-
ucation After Auschwitz’ which was first delivered as a radio broadcast in 1966, which he
begins with these words:
The premier demand upon all education is that Auschwitz not happen again ….
Every debate about the ideals of education is trivial and inconsequential compared to
this single ideal: never again Auschwitz. It was the barbarism all education strives
against.… and barbarism continues as long as the fundamental conditions that
favoured that relapse continue largely unchanged. That is the whole horror. (1967/
1998c, p. 191)
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Elsewhere, in the same year, he describes this ‘premier demand’ as a ‘new categorical
imperative’ on the whole of mankind (1966/1981a, p. 365). The education that Adorno
means is specifically ‘education toward critical self-reflection’ (1967/1998c, p.193). He
again returns to the idea that the prevailing civilization exerts pressure on the individual to
conform, to identify blindly with the collective, so destroying any power of resistance
(1967/1998c, p. 197). He makes some rather odd proposals in this essay and his analysis is
conspicuously eclectic but the basic message is consonant with ideas he developed
elsewhere, for example in the 1969 radio broadcast with Hellmut Becker, a prominent
German educationalist, transcribed in ‘Education for Maturity and Responsibility’ (1997)
where he speaks of ‘an education for protest and resistance’ (p. 31). Nicht mitmachen (do
not join in/be out of step), a favourite slogan of Adorno and his colleagues in the Institute
for Social Research from its early days (Jay, 1973, p. 321), could well be adopted as a
catchphrase of Adorno’s vision for education. But, he is by no means underestimating the
task he is setting. To be out of step means being at odds with the dominant consciousness,
which is fully equipped with an armoury of everything from sneering ridicule to judicial
and military force. The forces that would make possible the ‘relapse’ are ascendant and
hope is thin and fragile. The essay begins boldly but ends with a little shrug: ‘against this,
however, education and enlightenment can still manage a little something’ (1967/1998c,
p. 204).
So, what does Adorno say about teachers? Mass education is perhaps the most powerful
institutional tool in shaping and changing how people think and behave. He was conscious
of the role played by teachers in the Nazi era and was sensible of the importance of early
childhood experiences. In his 1961 lecture, ‘Philosophy and Teachers’, he reflects on the
experience of examining candidates for the profession on their chosen area of philosophy.
Some of his descriptions of encounters with students in this context are frankly funny,
though his intention is emphatically not to mock them or to be unkind. In reflecting on the
students’ ability to respond to questions he makes a distinction between the understanding
of the teacher’s role as that of ‘specialized technician’ and the notion of the teacher as an
intellectual. He explains the identity of the intellectual in this way:
Whether someone is an intellectual or not is manifested above all in his relationship
to his own work and to the societal totality of which it is part. This relationship… is
what constitutes the essence of philosophy in the first place. (1962/1998a, pp. 21–22)
The students who seem to have caused him the greatest vexation were not unintelligent or
lazy. They read the requirements of the task and followed them with precision; they studied
hard to acquire the information that they hoped would enable them to pass their
examination. What they did not seem to be able to do was to think, to respond to what they
had read and to care about its meaning. For a teacher to be an intellectual, she does not
have to have a great mass of facts at her fingertips; Adorno is quite scathing about this kind
of knowledge, describing it as a ‘patchwork of acquired—which most often means
memorized—facts’ (1962/1998a, p. 27). Rather it is the connectivity between the subject
matter—what is known—with ‘the societal totality’ that matters, and it is this that makes
an individual cultured. The capacity to make such connections is one thing that makes it
possible to cultivate others. Without the previous consideration of culture in terms of
resistance and critique, it would be difficult to understand Adorno’s intention here: a
teacher should be someone who ‘has culture’ and this is indicated by his being able to
demonstrate an interest in making connections and comparisons, in questioning what
happens to be the case, and being personally entangled in the immanent criticality of the
situation.
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Adorno struggles to describe how such capabilities develop: he admits that there are no
rules and no university courses that guarantee their acquisition. In a distinctively Hegelian
series of expressions, he says that it is more to do with an open mind and an ability to
engage and tarry with what is other and unfamiliar (1962/1998a, p. 28). He goes on,
evidently with some hesitation, to venture that in fact ‘culture requires love’ but this
uncharacteristically affirmative and simple suggestion is not explained here. What might he
mean?
In a recent examination of the place of intimacy in Adorno’s thought, Macdonald (2011)
describes how Adorno rejects the Kantian definition of autonomy in terms of rational
interiority, whilst accepting the idea that maturity is achieved by means of self-liberation
from heteronomy. To insist on a self-legislating subject is to throw out the baby with the
bath water. Thinking for oneself does not entail the abandonment of the context which has
called forth the thinking in the first place, rather moral thinking is ‘squeezed out of
‘‘matter’’ with which moral philosophy did not want to dirty its hands’ (1966/1981a,
p. 243). Intimacy is Adorno’s corrective to Kant’s concept of autonomy because there are
‘irreplaceable faculties which cannot flourish in the isolated cell of pure inwardness, but
only in live contact with the warmth of things’ (1951/2005, p. 43; Macdonald, 2011). ‘Live
contact’ is described as a non-coercive gaze and as ‘differentiation without domination’;
this is in stark contrast to the Enlightenment rationality which Adorno and Horkheimer
condemn as having the sole aim of dominating nature and other human beings. What holds
together this ‘unity of opposites’ is the ethical substance of Adorno’s thought. There is no
morality without the ‘material’; it is the ordinary and messy reality of life that gives rise to
the need for moral thinking. So, although Adorno emphatically endorses Kant’s idea of
autonomy as intellectual and moral maturity, his morality has to be to be mired in the
particularity of the everyday, the sensual, communicative living experience of non-reified
consciousness.
The suggestion that ‘culture requires love’ is comprehensible in the context of the
activity of teaching. Teaching is a hopeful activity, which demands resilience in the face
of setbacks and trust in the possibility of future maturation. To describe the values and
commitments inherent in the role of the teacher as love goes beyond the knowledge,
skills and processes involved in teaching, and it starts to illuminate what drives and
maintains the relationship of teacher and pupil. Adorno quite rightly says that ‘love
cannot be summoned in professionally mediated relationships’ (1967/1998c, p. 202), but
this does not mean that love ought not to be present in these relationships. A good teacher
warmly identifies with her pupils and is far from indifferent to what happens to them,
and, by implication, what happens to the world they will occupy, make and inherit. The
coldness that Adorno believes has infected everyone, more or less, through instrumental
rationality—the very logic of capitalism—made Auschwitz possible. But, if the premier
demand upon all education is that Auschwitz not happens again, we have to trust that
‘live contact with the warmth of things’ can happen in the university, the school and the
classroom. Cultural education has the potential to be where children can encounter the
richness and variety of human experience through the arts and also through personal
contact with the beliefs, values and traditions of different people. Crucially, it is also
where children can generate culture, renew tradition and express their own experiences,
thoughts and feelings.
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Conclusion
Louis MacNeice’s ‘Snow’, quoted at the beginning, explores the experience of sudden and
unexpected juxtapositions. In this poem, a room is suddenly transformed when snow starts
to fall, resulting in an unlikely, unseasonal meeting between the snow and the huge pink
roses sitting in the bay window. The exhilaration of the experience of the ‘collateral and
incompatible’ is tempered by a tension and a sober sense of foreboding—caused by the
distance between the two elements, which at the end of the poem seems far greater, an
unbridgeable gulf. But, the roses and snow do meet against the glass and in the poem itself.
MacNeice calls the condition of plurality ‘World’, a proper noun that hypostasizes this
condition as a personality—‘gay’ and ‘spiteful’ and capricious. These characteristics show
World alive. It is the liveliness and ambivalence that we find also in Adorno’s conception
of culture and his requirement for ‘live contact with the warmth of things’ against per-
meating coldness and indifference. This one theme in MacNeice’s poem is particularly apt
for helping develop a conceptual landscape for the plural and various, and why they are
troublesome and how they might be important for education and culture. Cultural edu-
cation happens in a complex and contested space. Different understandings of culture, the
artistic, the humanist and the anthropological, are all evident to different degrees in various
policy contexts. The plurality of culture and of cultures is a problem but also a site where
something distinctive and crucial happens: resistance or critical self-reflection as a core
aim of education takes place in a context of rich experience of incorrigible plurality.
Adorno rejects the notion that culture is a good in itself. His proposal that ‘true’ culture
is critical or philosophical departs from concern about whether a cultural practice is
somehow worthwhile because of its intrinsic or instrumental value. Instead attention is on
the way in which cultural participation becomes the site where we question what happens
to be the case and resist heteronomous ways of thinking. Cultural education requires an
environment in which both senses of culture converge as the objects of attention: as
creative endeavour and as a distinctive way of life. The attention is not goal-directed, that
is, merely instrumental in its intent, but rather it has what Iris Murdoch describes as a
concern for the individual and this concern is expressed in ‘an attentive patient delay of
judgement, a kind of humble agnosticism, which lets the object be’ (Murdoch 1992,
p. 377). MacNeice’s ‘Snow’ fixes a moment of transport that does not climax in possession
or resolution, which would be quite right when thinking about cultural education because
this is not an argument for cultural assimilation. Much as Adorno disliked the term ‘en-
counter’, because its use is so often hackneyed and vacuous, this does seem to be the
appropriate word. Cultural education involves a meeting; it entails risk and openness; and
it may not yield satisfaction. Like the snow and roses, it could be that we look but not
touch. Henry Giroux challenges the doctrine of ‘normative pluralism’, which gives us the
modern multicultural educational practice that aims to reduce intercultural tension, pro-
mote kindly tolerance and enhance mutual understanding (1988, pp. 94–97). These
intentions are laudable at least in so far as to desire their opposites would be reprehensible.
But, if it tends to make unimportant those deep differences that do exist, and to turn the
gaze away from uncomfortable truths about relations of power and privilege, it will
effectively close the critical space opened out in cultural education. In this respect, Adorno
anticipates Giroux’s point and help us to form an understanding of how culture and cultural
education embody rather than resolve difference, tension and conflict.
The Scottish Curriculum seeks to couple culture and history with a view to fostering
exploration, reflection and the solving of problems (Education Scotland 2013, p. 2). For
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these things to happen what is needed is richness of experience: plurality and variety. A
broad range of cultural experiences is good because it is harder for a person who is thus
experienced to avoid the idea that things could be otherwise than how they are and to
acquire ‘the ability to see in this world the possibility of something different and better’
(French and Thomas 1999, p. 3). On the other hand, the monochrome cultural experience
of an unvaried diet of commercially conceived disposable dross does not provide the
dynamic of the dialectical relationship with the societal totality of which it is part, nor is it
possible to unveil any inner dynamic of market and independence. On its own it is rubbish.
This is, in part, an argument for the inclusion of what Moffat and Riach have recently
called the ‘wayward artists and writers’ in the school curriculum. These are the people who
have pre-eminently rejected the ‘mortmain of the uniform identity that insists on any single
story dominating others’ (2014, loc.93). Helmut Becker in discussion with Adorno in 1969
advocated the ‘dissolution of an education system based on a fixed canon, and the
replacement of this canon by a very varied curriculum’ for precisely this reason (p. 30).
But, the rejection of uniform identity does not entail that we need be embarrassed to have
or seek an identity; as the same authors say elsewhere: ‘We are committed to an openness
of mind and the capacity for self-extension to which human nature is healthily prone…But
we should never neglect or scorn the work of our own people’ (2008, p. x). The idea that a
nation can sidestep the idea of national identity in considering cultural education is dan-
gerously mistaken. There is also a thin line between tolerance and indifference. Children
require opportunities to connect, contrast and compare: a significant challenge in any
content-orientated curriculum and a major challenge also to a profession already burdened
with increasingly complex demands.
Cultural education is in this way not in the slightest to be regarded as a decorative add-
on to the serious business of education but is at the heart of all worthwhile educational
effort. Adorno rightly observes that there is no rule or recipe for ‘achieving culture’, and no
course of study that ensures a person will become cultured in the sense he uses the word,
since the quality of the experiences depend on the comportment of the individual: their
curiosity and openness, and, most importantly, the ‘live contact with the warmth of things’
that can happen in the classroom community, where profound indifference to the fate of
others is not regarded as normal or acceptable. Reasonably, cultural education may ‘still
manage a little something’ by providing the objects of attention and expecting such things
to happen in a context where love and resistance are the currency.
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